Lyndon Johnson’s war
When Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson took the oath of allegiance as President in the Dallas-Fort Worth airport, some 16,000 American military personnel were serving in Vietnam. Johnson inherited Robert Strange McNamara as his secretary of defense and Gen. William Childs Westmoreland as his military commander in Vietnam.
The die was set: Distrusting the professional military, McNamara had established quantifiable indices, above all body count, as his means of measuring the progress of the war. Westmoreland, a hard-charging, can-do airborne officer, had set upon search-and-destroy operations aimed at communist main-force battalions as his means of achieving victory. For their part, the Hanoi leadership adopted a remarkably symmetrical strategy, aiming to wear down American resolve in a war of attrition.
First, however, Johnson had to secure election. Opposed by fire-breathing Republican Barry Goldwater, he ran as a peace candidate, portraying Goldwater as a mentally unstable warmonger. At the same time, he ordered preparations for a major escalation of the war while securing congressional approval for interim measures to preserve a rapidly unraveling South Vietnam. He succeeded on both counts – over the short term – using a North Vietnamese attack on U.S. destroyers in the Gulf of Tonkin in August to obtain a congressional resolution authorizing the use of whatever force he deemed proper and swamping Goldwater in the November election.
With Goldwater defeated, Johnson could escalate openly. In March 1965, Operation Rolling Thunder, an aerial bombing campaign against North Vietnam mounted from U.S. Air Force bases in Thailand and Navy carriers in the Gulf of Tonkin, was meant to dissuade Hanoi’s intervention in the south. More important, March marked the introduction of U.S. line infantry into South Vietnam.
Escalation and rising casualties
To this point, the brunt of American casualties had been borne by professional military officers and non-commissioned officers (NCOs), and the toll of those killed-in-action (KIA) had been relatively low. Now, young American conscripts, many of them Army draftees, would be locked in combat with the best the PAVN and PLAF (Peoples Liberation Armed Forces, the proper name for the Viet Cong) had to offer. American casualties would increase dramatically as the social – and political – profile of those affected by their loss changed. That, in turn, would feed the U.S. anti-war movement as increased draft call-ups threatened the plans of young men approaching the draft-registration age of 18.
Bombing of North Vietnam increased through the spring and summer of 1965, though President Johnson and Secretary McNamara exercised tight control over targets, the types of aircraft used, ordnance, and even tactics. At the same time, Army and Marine divisions began to engage the PLAF in search-and-destroy, and, in the case of the Marines, clear-and-hold operations.
Underestimating American mobility and firepower, the communist leaders sought to engage the Americans in stand-up battle. The result was several bloody engagements that shaped the course of the war. The first of these was on Nov. 12 at Bau Bang, a village on Route 13 north of Saigon, where 2nd Battalion, 2nd Infantry, 1st Infantry Division, reinforced with an artillery battery and an armored cavalry troop, was attacked by two PLAF main force regiments of the 9th (Viet Cong) Division. The Viet Cong achieved surprise, attacking under cover of mortar and recoilless rifle fire only to be driven back with heavy loss. The largest and best known was the fight between three regular PAVN regiments and the First Air Cavalry Division’s 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry (1/ 7th) at LZ (Landing Zone) X-Ray in the Central Highlands on Nov. 14-15. It was the first test of air cavalry tactics and a bloody setback for the PAVN, devastated by American firepower including B-52 strikes. The PAVN did, however, gain a measure of revenge by all but annihilating the 1st’s sister battalion, the 2/7th – the battalion Gen. George Custer had led to oblivion at the Little Big Horn – on the 16th.
Ambush vs. Search and Destroy
From this, the PAVN and American leadership drew different lessons. The communists concluded that they could not, as they had hoped, stand up to the Americans in open battle and should avoid direct confrontation in favor of ambushing US forces under favorable terms. Westmoreland concluded that his search-and-destroy strategy was a winner and determined to pursue it more aggressively. The Marines objected, understanding the dynamics of revolutionary warfare better than Westmoreland and favoring clear-and-hold operations and emphasizing civic actions to achieve population control and gain intelligence. But Westmoreland was insistent, forcing the Marines to commit the bulk of their resources to search-and-destroy operations.
These oddly complementary decisions established the pattern of ground operations in South Vietnam for the next two years, during which American, South Vietnamese, and communist casualties mounted.
The U.S. brought its full array of weaponry to bear, including armor and heavy artillery. The biggest change from previous conflicts was in small arms, where the M-14 rifle and M-1919 light machine gun gave way to the M-16 rifle – actually an assault carbine – and to the M-60 machine gun. The effective 40mm M-79 grenade launcher made its debut in Vietnam. For their part, the PLAF were armed from mid-1964 with the redoubtable AK-47 assault carbine and a full array of Soviet-designed and Chinese-manufactured machine guns, recoilless rifles, and BK-7 rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs), all brought down the Ho Chi Minh Trail from the north. Regular North Vietnamese units were similarly armed from the start.
The ARVN was initially supplied with castoff U.S. World War II arms and equipment and second-line Regional Forces/Popular Forces (“Ruff Puff”) militia units retained them to the end. The same applied to U.S.-supplied guerrillas in Laos. Regular ARVN units were not completely equipped with M-16s until late 1967, and until then were outgunned by the communists. U.S. uniforms and footgear proved unsuitable for jungle warfare. World War II-style combat boots quickly gave way to jungle boots; utility uniforms gave way to jungle fatigues; flak vests were ubiquitous. Click here to go to Part 4.
U.S. Marine Corps (top), U.S. Army (middle), and U.S. Navy (bottom) photos courtesy Jim Mesko.
